

Public spending on defence, public order and safety in Spain and the European Union

Article 05
01/08/2024

<https://doi.org/10.53479/37495>

Rationale

The aim of this article is to provide an overview of public spending on security (which includes defence and public order and safety), in the European Union (EU) and in Spain and to discuss proposals on the joint and coordinated provision and funding of this European public good.

Takeaways

- The current environment of global geopolitical tension is behind the strengthening of the EU's security policy, encouraging greater strategic autonomy. Meeting demands for greater security spending places further strain on public finances at a time when government deficit and debt levels are high.
- The level of public security expenditure in the EU and Spain, which stood at 3% of GDP in 2022 in both cases, is lower than spending by other global powers. Relatively more of that amount in the EU and Spain goes to staff costs, with less going to research and development (R&D).
- Redirecting spending towards R&D could generate economic efficiency gains. Moreover, given that security is considered to be a European public good, joint, coordinated provision and funding could yield additional benefits.

Keywords

Security and defence spending, COFOG database, EU budget, EU public good.

JEL classification

E62, H56, H77, H87.

Authors:

Fernando López Vicente
International Economics and Euro Area
Department. Banco de España

Marta Rodríguez Vives
European Central Bank

Juan Rojas
Economic Developments Department
Banco de España

Introduction

The current context of global geopolitical tension highlights the challenges and risks related to national security. In particular, with the threats to national security (such as cyber security, terrorism and organised crime) taking on a whole new scale, the boundaries between internal and external security are becoming increasingly blurred. European institutions already explicitly recognise the need to think about the two together when planning a coordinated response among member countries to address this challenge, as can be seen from the 2020 EU Security Union Strategy.¹

Elsewhere, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has also precipitated a paradigm shift in EU security and defence policy, leading to the approval of the Strategic Compass² in 2022. This initiative seeks to narrow the capability gaps between the EU and other powers and bolster EU cooperation and strategic autonomy by 2030. Concrete objectives include spending more and better on defence, reducing the shortfalls identified in investment volume and defence systems quality, as well as bolstering the productive capacity and technological foundations of the European security industry, which operates in a fragmented market where firms have deep ties to national governments and there is a dependence on external critical resources and equipment.³

Implementing this strategy has led EU countries, as well as the European Commission, to place more emphasis on defence spending,⁴ which is, for North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Allies, in line with the political commitment that body's members agreed to in 2014: that national defence budgets reach at least 2% of GDP by 2024.⁵ Furthermore, surveys suggest that the public is increasingly open to closer European defence cooperation, including on military equipment purchases and production capacity, and higher defence spending.⁶

However, implementing these initiatives and commitments further squeezes public finances in EU Member States at a time when government deficit and debt levels are higher than before the

1 In 2020, the EU adopted a new [EU Security Union Strategy](#) for the period 2020-25, which recognises that security is a multifaceted issue with cross-cutting impacts on both internal and external security questions.

2 Council of the European Union (2022).

3 European Commission (2022).

4 European Defence Agency (2023).

5 NATO estimates that 16 countries (from the EU) will meet this commitment by 2024, compared with eight that were above the threshold in 2021, since when defence spending-to-GDP has risen by an average of 0.3 percentage points (pp). Spain, which increased defence spending by 2 pp over that period, will still fall around 0.7 pp short of the 2% threshold in 2024. This commitment seeks to correct the effects of the "peace dividend" enjoyed in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union (the phrase appeared in the literature to refer to the opportunity cost of maintaining high military budgets during the Cold War) and the 2008 financial crisis, which led to widespread cuts in defence spending in Western countries, making way for other expenditure items deemed to have higher priority. The commitment also includes earmarking 20% of the budget for the development and innovation of military equipment and the acquisition of capabilities that are considered critical. For more information, see Ministry of Defence (2014) (only available in Spanish) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2024).

6 European Union (2023, 2024).

pandemic.⁷ Simply complying with NATO commitments would entail an increase in defence spending of nearly 0.7 pp of GDP across the EU above levels recorded over the last decade (a rise of approximately 0.9 pp in the case of Spain). In addition, the entry into force of the new European fiscal rules will mean that the most indebted countries will have to implement fiscal consolidation processes, which may limit the room for manoeuvre for addressing these new spending needs.

Moreover, many studies and analysts have identified the EU's defence and security gaps.⁸ These are partly the result of a lack of cooperation at European level, including joint financing of public goods that go beyond the domestic horizon – for which a thorough debate is needed on the rationale, reasonableness, efficiency and effectiveness, not only of their funding, but also of their coordinated provision at European level, among other issues.

Against this background, this article has three aims. First, to provide an overview of the level and composition of public spending on defence and public order and safety in the European Union and Spain, including a comparison with the key international players. Second, to present the perspectives and challenges for security spending in the EU in the context of the various European strategies to spend more and better on security. Lastly, some proposals are discussed regarding the need, efficiency and effectiveness in the joint provision and funding of this European public good, including the potential impact that a reallocation of resources across expenditure items could have on improving their efficiency.

Analysis of public spending on security

In the context of this article, government security expenditure is defined as aggregate government spending on defence and public order and safety according to a country's national accounts. We analyse public security expenditure using the classification of the functions of government database (COFOG),⁹ in which the latest data correspond to 2022 and which is the only source that allows for a harmonised and differentiated classification of spending on defence (Division 02) and public order and safety (Division 03). It should be noted that there is a positive correlation between these two items at the global level, i.e. countries that devote more resources (as a percentage of GDP) to defence also tend to spend more on internal security (see Chart 1.a). This may reflect, among other factors, the increasingly blurred boundary between the internal and external dimensions of national security. Moreover, in 2022 these two divisions accounted for approximately 6% of aggregate government expenditure in the EU, equivalent to 3% of GDP (see Chart 1.b),

7 The implementation of this strategy also poses a challenge to the ability of the European defence and security industry to respond to the sharp increase expected in demand, in terms of both physical and human capital.


8 See, for example, International Relations Committee Work stream on Open Strategic Autonomy (2023), European Commission (2022), Bergmann, Morcos, Wall and Monaghan (2022) and Scazzieri (2023).

9 The classification of the functions of government was developed in accordance with the United Nations methodology. The database contains data on government expenditure, classified according to the national accounts criteria (System of National Accounts 2008), into ten categories, depending on its economic purpose. It is important to note that in the case of defence spending, numerous studies use other databases, such as that of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, whose methodology differs from COFOG, which may give rise to discrepancies in estimates of defence spending.


Chart 1

Overview of security spending in Europe

1.a Correlation between spending on defence and on public order and safety in Europe (2022)



1.b Government spending on security in Europe (2022)



SOURCE: Eurostat.



although there is a great degree of cross-country heterogeneity. Spain's spending on this category is similar to the European average.


By component, defence spending amounted to 2.6% of total government expenditure in the EU in 2022 (see Chart 2.a), accounting for 1.3% of GDP. Among the main EU countries, Spain and Germany are at the lower end, with values close to 1% of GDP, compared with 1.8% in France. Relative to other powers, the average European level of spending is much lower than that of the United States (3.3% of GDP), the United Kingdom (2.1%) and Russia (2.0%), and is more in line with expenditure in China and Japan.

Spending on public order and safety in the EU is slightly higher than on defence (see Chart 2.b), amounting to 3.4% of total public spending or 1.7% of GDP (1.9% of GDP in Spain), with less cross-country disparity than in the case of defence. Turning to other countries, public order and safety spending stands at around 2% in the United Kingdom and the United States, while it reaches 2.3% in Russia. China and Japan both allocate it around 1.2% of GDP.


Chart 2

Spending on security, by component

2.a Defence spending (a)



2.b Public order and safety spending (a)



SOURCES: Eurostat, IMF and OECD.

a The latest data for Russia and the United States date from 2020 and 2021, respectively.



By function, the main item of defence spending in Spain and in the EU as a whole is military expenditure (see Chart 3.a), which accounts for 1% and 1.2% of GDP, respectively. In addition, several EU countries, such as Greece and the Baltic States, spend well above average on their militaries. It is noteworthy that spending on defence R&D is virtually zero in most EU countries, with the exception of France, where it amounts to 0.1% of GDP – itself well below the 0.4% of GDP seen in the United States.¹⁰


Spending on public order and safety (see Chart 3.b) is mainly allocated to the police (0.9% of GDP in the EU and 1.2% in Spain), followed by the law courts (0.3% of GDP in the EU and 0.4% in Spain), while R&D receives nothing.

¹⁰ There are certain limitations on the publication of defence R&D spending internationally, which makes comparisons between countries difficult. In this area, the most up-to-date data available are for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.


Chart 3

Spending on security, by function

3.a Breakdown of defence spending in the EU (2022)



3.b Breakdown of spending on public order and safety (2022)



SOURCE: Eurostat.

NOTE: The sample of countries selected includes the EU, the four large economies of the euro area and the EU countries that spend most, as a percentage of GDP, on defence and safety, respectively.



Based on a breakdown by category of expenditure, for both defence and public order and safety, the bulk of EU resources go to employee compensation, especially in the case of public order and safety spending, followed by intermediate government consumption and investment, especially in the case of defence spending (see Chart 4). Patterns of spending in Spain are similar to those in the wider EU. Comparatively speaking, the United Kingdom spends the least on staff costs, spending more on intermediate consumption and investment, both in defence and public order and safety.


Finally, it is important to place defence spending within the context of a country's military capability. Military capacity is a multifaceted concept¹¹ related, in part, to the composition of military spending, the ability to fund such spending and strategic autonomy. In particular, it includes elements such as troop numbers, military equipment, availability of raw materials and infrastructure, local armament industry capacity, as well as geographical and financial factors. The level of defence spending in the EU – and in certain European countries, such as Spain – is roughly comparable, in

¹¹ The most used indicator to measure this is that developed by the [Global Fire Power](#) military statistics website.


Chart 4

Classification of spending on security by category of expenditure

4.a Government spending on defence, by type (a)



4.b Government spending on public order and safety, by type (a)



SOURCES: Banco de España, drawing on Eurostat, IMF and OECD data.

a Chart data from 2022, except for Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom, where they date from 2019, 2020 and 2021, respectively. "Transfers" includes capital transfers and other current transfers. "Other" refers to the remaining accounting items and, in the case of Russia, also includes investment and transfers.



terms of GDP, with levels in China and Japan, although military capacity differs significantly (see Chart 5, where a lower value on the vertical axis indicates greater military capacity). The scale of military spending in the United States is noteworthy since, while it does appear to have the primary military operational capacity in the world, that capacity is only slightly ahead of Russia and China. This relative gap between spending and military capacity could, at least partly, reflect some of the shortcomings highlighted in the European Strategic Compass (in terms of operational capacity, levels of investment and industrial productive and technological capacity) and could point to the need to improve not only the composition and efficiency of defence spending, but also to strengthen coordination and cooperation between EU countries.¹²


As noted above, in the current geopolitical context, Europe's governments and citizens have been leaning increasingly towards strengthening the EU's strategic autonomy in terms of security and defence. This trend has gathered pace since the approval of the new European strategies in this

¹² International Relations Committee Work stream on Open Strategic Autonomy (2023).

Chart 5

Military capacity and spending on defence and military personnel (a)

5.a International comparison of military capacity and defence spending



SOURCES: Global Firepower ranking, Eurostat, IMF and OECD.

a Data on military spending (COFOG) are from 2022, except in the cases of Russia and the United States, where they date from 2020 and 2021, respectively. The size of the circle indicates the number of active military personnel. The horizontal axis indicates military spending as a percentage of GDP. The vertical axis indicates military capacity according to the PowerIndex, where values closer to zero represent greater capacity. The EU's military capacity has been approximated as a weighted average of that of Italy (0.1863), France (0.1878), Germany (0.2847) and Spain (0.2882). The large European economies appear in the top 20 of the global ranking. The remaining EU countries have less military capacity.



area. In the specific case of defence, recent years have already seen a rise in spending across the EU as a whole. Despite this, some of the EU's main countries (including Italy, Germany and Spain) still appear to be falling short of the 2% spending commitment agreed on with NATO, and they may therefore be expected to make up ground going forward. Even were this target to be met in 2024, by international standards the EU as a whole would still lag behind other NATO countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom (see Chart 6).

The gaps identified in security and defence when designing the new European strategies, together with the delay on the part of some European countries in meeting their defence spending policy commitments, may, at least in part, reveal the limitations of national initiatives in this area, which could prove insufficient to meet the common target of enhancing and strengthening European security as a public good.¹³ With this in mind, the EU institutions stress the need to take a coordinated, collective Europe-wide approach, avoiding national solutions that might limit the potential of the available military equipment, while also deepening the fragmentation of the European defence sector and intensifying its external dependencies.¹⁴ Indeed, despite the growing trend towards cooperation within the bloc in the form of the initiatives and programmes rolled out under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence


13 In 2017 the European Council also agreed on a successive medium-term increase in investment expenditure to 20% of total defence spending in order to fill strategic capability gaps. As things stand, the average in the main European countries stands at 25%, in line with other economic powers. Lastly, there is also a commitment to increase the share of defence spending on R&D to 2%, although the European countries are currently well short of this target.

14 European Commission (2022).

Chart 6

Defence spending according to NATO (2024) (a)

6.a Comparison of COFOG and NATO data



SOURCES: NATO (June 2024), Eurostat and IMF (COFOG).

a The NATO figures for 2024 are estimates. The COFOG figures for the United States are from 2021.



Policy, military spending in the EU is currently decided at national level.¹⁵ As far as spending on public order and safety is concerned, the EU's 2020 Security Union Strategy also envisages the need to develop joint instruments and measures which, while remaining coherent with and complementary to external action in the field of defence, guarantee the physical and digital safety of EU citizens.

The need for joint action in the field of security and defence

The characterisation of security and defence as a public good finds broad consensus in the literature and is key to defining a joint, coordinated Europe-wide strategy, which may call for a new institutional framework.¹⁶ In particular, the literature notes that the economic, institutional and political features of these areas of spending transcend any purely national perspective. Indeed, the provision of these types of public goods at a national level may lead to distortions in volume and composition based on domestic (as opposed to common and shared) needs, to fragmentation (including as a result of the different budgetary capacities of each EU member state), to greater external dependency in the procurement of equipment, and to inefficiency from both a strategic and an economic standpoint. Conversely, coordinated EU-wide provision could yield lower costs and greater synergies in areas such as the production and management of the overall stock of defence equipment, public procurement processes, the level of R&D investment


15 See International Relations Committee Work stream on Open Strategic Autonomy (2023) for a description of the numerous initiatives rolled out in recent years in the above area, including: the Permanent Structured Cooperation to enhance capacities and develop joint investment programmes; the creation, within the European Commission, of the Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) to boost defence R&D; and the approval of the EU Strategic Compass, a roadmap for the development of the EU's strategic autonomy goals, including defence goals.

16 Fontana and Vannuccini (2024).

Chart 7

Budgeted government spending on defence R&D

7.a International comparison of budgeted spending on defence R&D



SOURCE: OECD.

and funding capacity.¹⁷ This is precisely the thinking that lies behind the European initiatives referred to above, which seek to foster greater cooperation among member countries in order to take action in the fields of cybersecurity, terrorism, organised crime, military missions and security and defence investment projects, all of which call for ever greater resources and require considerable coordination to enhance their operating capacity. Meanwhile, ramping up European production and provision of military equipment could help to reduce the sizeable import component of EU military expenditure, thereby boosting its multiplier effect on economic growth.¹⁸

Indeed, greater cooperation (which limits home country bias) would help more efficiently reallocate the EU's total security expenditure across its different components, enabling greater resources to be assigned to investment and R&D activities, which could have a positive knock-on effect on both operating capacities and the economic efficiency of spending in terms of its impact on growth.¹⁹ On this point, the literature notes that R&D is among the goods that most clearly qualify as a European public good, and should therefore be provided and funded, at least in part, at a supranational level.²⁰ Here, the gap between the United States and other economic powers (including the EU member countries) is a sizeable one, which could strengthen the argument made above (see Chart 7).

17 International Relations Committee Work stream on Open Strategic Autonomy (2023).

18 Maulny (2023) notes that external suppliers (mainly the United States) accounted for 78% of the total defence acquisitions announced by EU governments between the outbreak of war in Ukraine and June 2023.

19 The effects of military expenditure on economic growth has been debated in the academic literature, which, while not conclusive when analysed at aggregate level, points to the importance of the composition of such expenditure, revealing a positive impact on growth in the case of military spending on R&D (see, e.g. Dupor and Guerrero, 2016; Alptekin and Levine, 2012; Barro and Redlick, 2011; International Relations Committee Work stream on Open Strategic Autonomy, 2023).

20 Wyplosz (2024).

With all of these considerations in mind, the implementation of a central fiscal capacity at European level to support and complement national budgets in the funding of spending on security and defence appears preferable to a piecemeal approach. Under current EU legislation, Community budget items cannot be explicitly earmarked for spending on defence.²¹ Nonetheless, new funding facilities have recently been set in place, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF)²², forming part of the European Commission's 2021-27 multiannual budget, the Instrument for the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry through Common Procurement (EDIRPA)²³, or the various European Investment Bank financing facilities in support of firms in the defence sector.²⁴

Along these lines, some authors²⁵ have proposed creating a European public goods fund, which could be endowed with €750 billion and which would take the place of NextGenerationEU (NGEU) when it expires in 2026. The fund would be financed with supranational bonds issued by the EU and by national contributions. Its aim would be to support cross-border projects (such as strategic autonomy initiatives), while also constituting a lever with which to strengthen compliance with European fiscal rules, as eligibility would be subject to compliance with certain fiscal conditions.

Conclusions

The analysis set out in this article shows the current state of government spending on security (encompassing spending on defence and on public order and safety), while also comparing such expenditure with that in other representative geographical regions. This highlights the existing disparity in the level, composition and purpose of such spending across not only the EU countries, but also the different geographic regions considered. By placing these figures within the context of the EU's security and defence strategies – as well as the political commitments taken on within NATO – to increase and enhance such spending with a view to boosting its autonomy and strategic capacity, the scale of the fiscal challenge posed by the need to strengthen the EU Member Countries' defence and security budgets also becomes clear. The current provision and funding of defence and public order services at national level in the EU point to some of the shortcomings identified in the EU's strategies in this area (which are particularly stark in the case of defence). With all of this in mind, this article posits the need for an exhaustive debate, from a strategic and economic standpoint, on the joint, coordinated provision and funding of this public good at European level.

21 See Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union.

22 Created in 2021, the EDF is managed by the DG DEFIS with the aim of funding defence R&D projects. It has a budget of €8 billion, of which €2.7 billion comes from the EU budget and €5.3 billion is co-financed by the national governments.

23 In October 2023, the European Council adopted a Regulation ([European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act, or EDIRPA](#)) establishing an instrument with the aim of encouraging Member States to make joint acquisitions of defence products. Under this instrument, a partial reimbursement from the EU budget will be available to Member States where joint purchases involve a consortium of at least three Member States and at least 65% of the end products' components originate in the EU or an associated country. It has a budget of €300 million.

24 Notable examples include the Strategic European Security Initiative, for which €8 billion has been earmarked, and the €175 million Defence Equity Facility, implemented within the framework of InvestEU in conjunction with the European Defence Fund.

25 Buti, Bakker and Beetsma (2024).

REFERENCES

- Alptekin, A. and P. Levine. (2012). "Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Meta-analysis". *European Journal of Political Economy*, 28(4), pp. 636–650. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268012000432>
- Barro, R. and C. Redlick. (2011). "Macroeconomic Effects from Government Purchases and Taxes". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(11), pp. 51-102. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23015664>
- Bergmann, M., P. Morcos, C. Wall and S. Monaghan. (2022). "Transforming European Defense". CSIS Briefs, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, August. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/220818_Bergmann_European_Defense.pdf
- Briganti, E. (2023). "On the Effects of Government Purchases and Their Transmission Mechanism". Unpublished. https://edoardobriganti.github.io/research/edoardo_briganti_JMP.pdf
- Buti, M., Bakker, A. and R. Beetsma. (2024). "Investing in European Public Goods While Maintaining Fiscal Discipline at Home". *Intereconomics*, 59(2), pp. 98–103. <https://doi:10.2478/ie-2024-0021>
- Buti, M., A. Coloccia and M. Messori. (2023). "European public goods". *CEPR VoxEU*. 9 June. <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/european-public-goods>
- Cepparulo, A. and P. Pasimeni. (2024). "Defence Spending in the European Union". Discussion Paper 199, European Commission. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f5827354-8501-49cb-bf2d-13f2f7a9444f_en
- Council of the European Union. (2022). "A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence - For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security". <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf>
- Dupor, W. D. and R. Guerrero. (2016). "Local and Aggregate Fiscal Policy Multipliers". Working Paper Series, 2016-004C, FRB St. Louis. <http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.2016.004>
- European Commission. (2022). *JOIN(2022) 24 final on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward*. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/4bcf9a69-ed82-4a74-836f-b85bb16725f6_en
- European Defence Agency. (2023). *Annual Report*. <https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2024/04/24/filling-gaps-in-eu-defences-eda-publishes-its-2023-annual-report>
- European Union. (2023). "Standard Eurobarometer 99 – Spring 2023". <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3052>
- European Union. (2024). "Standard Eurobarometer 101 – Spring 2024". <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3216>
- International Relations Committee Work stream on Open Strategic Autonomy. (2023). "The EU's Open Strategic Autonomy from a central banking perspective - Challenges to the monetary policy landscape from a changing geopolitical environment". Occasional Paper Series, 311, European Central Bank. <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op311~5065ff588c.en.pdf>
- Fontana, O. and S. Vannuccini. (2024). "How to institutionalise European industrial policy for strategic autonomy and the green transition". LUISS Institute for European Analysis and Policy Working Paper 7/2024. <https://leap.luiss.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/WP7.24-How-to-institutionalise-European-industrial-policy-.pdf>
- Maulny, J. P. (2023). "The impact of the war in Ukraine on the European defence market". IRIS policy paper. https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/19_ProgEuropeIndusDef_JPMaulny.pdf
- Ministerio de Defensa. (2014). "La OTAN se reafirma". *Revista Española de Defensa*, September 2014. <https://www.defensa.gob.es/Galerias/gabinete/red/2014/red-309-la-otan-se-reafirma.pdf>
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2024). "Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2024)". https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf
- Scazzieri, L. (2023). "Is European defence missing its moment?". Center for European Reform INSIGHT, 16 January. https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/insight_LS_defence_16.1.23.pdf

United Nations. (2022). *New threats to human security in the Anthropocene. Demanding greater solidarity.* (2022 Special Report). United Nations Development Programme. <https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/srhs2022overviewen.pdf>

Wyplosz, R. (2024). "Which European public goods?". European Parliament. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2024/755722/IPOL_IDA\(2024\)755722_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2024/755722/IPOL_IDA(2024)755722_EN.pdf)

How to cite this document

López Vicente, Fernando, Marta Rodríguez Vives and Juan Rojas. (2024). "Public spending on defence, public order and safety in Spain and the European Union". *Economic Bulletin - Banco de España*, 2024/Q3, 05. <https://doi.org/10.53479/37495>

Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.

© Banco de España, Madrid, 2024

ISSN 1695-9086 (online edition)