The effects of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policies from 2011 to 2018 on banking assets
Autor
Fecha de publicación
24-may-2024
Descripción física
74 p.
Resumen
En este trabajo estudiamos los efectos de las tres principales políticas monetarias no convencionales del Banco Central Europeo (BCE) en los bancos de la zona del euro desde 2011. Más concretamente, nos centramos en el impacto sobre los préstamos, cartera de soberanos y depósitos en bancos centrales. Las tres políticas del BCE objeto de estudio son las operaciones de financiación a largo plazo (LTRO, por sus siglas en inglés), los programas de compra de activos y el tipo de interés del BCE en su facilidad de depósito. Asimismo, comparamos las respuestas de los países que no sufrieron la crisis soberana con las de los que sí la sufrieron. Concluimos que las medidas de política monetaria no convencionales del BCE aumentaron los préstamos a empresas en los países de la zona del euro. La segunda ronda de LTRO, también conocidas como LTRO dirigidas (TLTRO, por sus siglas en inglés), condicionó los nuevos préstamos. Este cambio tuvo un efecto sustancialmente mayor en el crédito bancario. Los efectos calculados de los tamaños promedio de las LTRO y las TLTRO indican que, en los países que no padecieron la crisis, las LTRO aumentaron los préstamos a empresas en un 7,6 % de los activos y las TLTRO aumentaron los préstamos en un 16,4 % de los activos. Estos incrementos fueron del 8,4 % y el 14,6 %, respectivamente, para las LTRO y las TLTRO en los países que soportaron la crisis. Tanto las LTRO como las TLTRO se asocian con reducciones de la cartera soberana en bancos domiciliados en países que no sufrieron la crisis, mientras que las LTRO se asocian con incrementos en la deuda soberana en poder de bancos en países que la sufrieron.
We examine the effects of all three major European Central Bank (ECB) unconventional monetary policies since 2011 for euro area banks’ holdings of loans, government securities and cash deposited in central banks. The three ECB policies are longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), the asset purchase programmes and the ECB’s interest rate on its deposit facility. We also compare the responses of non-crisis and crisis countries to these policies. Our evidence indicates that the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures increased bank lending across the euro area countries. The second round of LTROs, also known as targeted LTROs (TLTROs), were conditional on banks increasing their lending. This change had a substantially larger effect on total lending by banks. The computed effects of the LTROs and TLTROs, based on average size, indicate that in non-crisis countries LTROs increased bank loans by 7.6% of assets and TLTROs increased bank loans by 16.4% of assets, whereas in crisis countries the increases were 8.4% and 14.6% for LTROs and TLTROs, respectively. We find that both LTROs and TLTROs were associated with decreases in government securities held by banks in non-crisis countries, while the LTROs were associated with increases in government securities held by banks in crisis countries.
We examine the effects of all three major European Central Bank (ECB) unconventional monetary policies since 2011 for euro area banks’ holdings of loans, government securities and cash deposited in central banks. The three ECB policies are longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), the asset purchase programmes and the ECB’s interest rate on its deposit facility. We also compare the responses of non-crisis and crisis countries to these policies. Our evidence indicates that the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures increased bank lending across the euro area countries. The second round of LTROs, also known as targeted LTROs (TLTROs), were conditional on banks increasing their lending. This change had a substantially larger effect on total lending by banks. The computed effects of the LTROs and TLTROs, based on average size, indicate that in non-crisis countries LTROs increased bank loans by 7.6% of assets and TLTROs increased bank loans by 16.4% of assets, whereas in crisis countries the increases were 8.4% and 14.6% for LTROs and TLTROs, respectively. We find that both LTROs and TLTROs were associated with decreases in government securities held by banks in non-crisis countries, while the LTROs were associated with increases in government securities held by banks in crisis countries.
Publicado en
Documentos de Trabajo / Banco de España, 2416
Materias
Área del euro; Política monetaria no convencional; Bancos; Crisis financiera; Euro area; Unconventional monetary policy; Banks; Financial crisis; Bancos centrales; Política monetaria
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