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Campo DC | Valor |
---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Puente, Sergio |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-08-10T17:47:34Z |
dc.date.available | 2019-08-10T17:47:34Z |
dc.date.issued | 2006-08-01 |
dc.identifier.issn | ISSN: 0213-2710 (en papel) |
dc.identifier.issn | ISSN: 1579-8666 (en línea) |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorio.bde.es/handle/123456789/6874 |
dc.description.abstract | A concept of dynamic stability in infinitely repeated games with discounting is presented. For this purpose, one modification of the available theory is needed: we need to relax the assumption that the game starts in a given period. Under this new framework, we propose stable strategies such that a folk theorem with an additional stability requirement still holds. Under these strategies, convergence to the long run outcome is achieved in a finite number of periods, no matter what actions or deviations have been played in the past. Hence, we suggest a way in which a player can build up his reputation after a deviation. [resumen de autor] |
dc.format.extent | 26 p. : fórmulas |
dc.language.iso | en |
dc.publisher | Banco de España |
dc.relation.ispartof | Documentos de Trabajo / Banco de España, 0618 |
dc.rights | Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) |
dc.rights | In Copyright - Non Commercial Use Permitted |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.es_ES |
dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC-NC/1.0/ |
dc.subject | Repeated Games |
dc.subject | Stability |
dc.subject | Stable Strategies |
dc.title | Dynamic stability in repeated games |
dc.type | Documento de trabajo |
dc.identifier.bdebib | 000187724 |
dc.identifier.bdepub | DTRA-200618-eng |
dc.subject.bde | Teoría de juegos y de la negociación |
dc.publisher.bde | Madrid : Banco de España, 2006 |
dc.subject.jel | C70 |
dc.subject.jel | C72 |