2024-03-29T14:16:10Zhttps://repositorio.bde.es/oai/requestoai:repositorio.bde.es:123456789/69392023-06-08T12:34:22Zcom_123456789_5661com_123456789_21col_123456789_5688
Repositorio Institucional
author
Kujal, Praveen
author
Ruiz PĂ©rez, Juan Manuel
2019-08-10T17:54:53Z
2019-08-10T17:54:53Z
2009-02-26
ISSN: 0213-2710 (en papel)
https://repositorio.bde.es/handle/123456789/6939
000222480
DTRA-200901-eng
This paper highlights the importance of product differentiation and endogenous R&D in determining the optimal R&D policy, in a model where investment in cost reducing R&D is committed before firms compete in a differentiated-goods third-country export market. R&D is always taxed in oligopolies for high degrees of product differentiation. For lower degrees of product differentiation the duopoly is subsidized or the government remains inactive. In contrast, the monopoly is always subsidized. The government with a duopoly may be active or inactive depending on the degree of product differentiation. Thus, we may observe a reversal in the sign of the optimal R&D policy if the degree of product differentiation changes or, alternatively, if there is a change in the number of firms. Similar qualitative results hold if trade policy uses output subsidies, instead of R&D promotion
eng
Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
Product differentiation
Strategic trade policy
Policy reversals
R&D subsidies
Monopoly
Duopoly
International trade policy towards monopoly and oligopoly
Documento de trabajo
URL
https://repositorio.bde.es/bitstream/123456789/6939/1/dt0901e.pdf
File
MD5
69f0b10917db47fdcfa6f03ba9b9e4b8
905548
application/pdf
dt0901e.pdf
URL
https://repositorio.bde.es/bitstream/123456789/6939/2/dt0901e.pdf.txt
File
MD5
7b304beaa884ffb380d8daf215ebc106
49371
text/plain
dt0901e.pdf.txt