Asset holdings, information aggregation in secondary markets and credit cycles
Authors
Issue Date
29-Mar-2022
Physical description
74 p.
Abstract
La agregación de información imperfecta en los mercados secundarios de crédito tiene consecuencias significativas para los ciclos económicos. A medida que los bancos dan más importancia a variaciones en el valor de mercado de sus carteras, concluyen que lo mejor es no revelar al mercado en general la información sobre shocks adversos. En consecuencia, el riesgo de incumplimiento se valora incorrectamente, y los volúmenes de préstamo y, por lo tanto, la inversión no se reducen adecuadamente. La sobreinversión reduce el precio del capital, y esto lleva a los hogares a aumentar el consumo sin disminuir la oferta laboral, lo que genera un auge económico. Debido a la fijación errónea de precios, los bancos tienen posteriormente mayores pérdidas y enfrentan una caída de su capital. Luego, la producción disminuye bruscamente, debido a la escasez de la oferta de crédito. En un modelo calibrado para la economía estadounidense, estos casos de disfunción del mercado son cruciales para ampliar los ciclos crediticios.
Imperfect information aggregation in secondary credit markets has significant consequences for economic cycles. As banks put more weight on mark-to-market gains, they find it optimal to refrain from revealing information about adverse shocks. Consequently, default risk is mispriced, and loan volumes, and thus investment, are not appropriately reduced. Overinvestment lowers the price of capital, leading households to increase consumption without decreasing labour supply, generating a boom. Due to mispricing, banks subsequently face bigger losses and capital depletion. Output then decreases sharply due to credit supply shortages. In a model calibrated to the US economy, these instances of market dysfunction are crucial in amplifying credit cycles.
Imperfect information aggregation in secondary credit markets has significant consequences for economic cycles. As banks put more weight on mark-to-market gains, they find it optimal to refrain from revealing information about adverse shocks. Consequently, default risk is mispriced, and loan volumes, and thus investment, are not appropriately reduced. Overinvestment lowers the price of capital, leading households to increase consumption without decreasing labour supply, generating a boom. Due to mispricing, banks subsequently face bigger losses and capital depletion. Output then decreases sharply due to credit supply shortages. In a model calibrated to the US economy, these instances of market dysfunction are crucial in amplifying credit cycles.
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Documentos de Trabajo / Banco de España, 2214
Other versions
Subjects
Revelación de información; Mercados; Information revelation; Credit markets; Mark-to-market; Mispricing; Bank compensation; Regulación y supervisión de instituciones financieras; Teoría monetaría; Política monetaria; Fluctuaciones y ciclos económicos; Sistemas bancarios y actividad crediticia
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